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The concept of the State of Law
Abstract
Political systems of various states are currently described as the rule of law states, law-
abiding states, democratic states ruled by law, lawful states, or law-governed states? 
Mostly, it is noticed that the states ruled by law are characterized by the fact that the 
power is exercised by the set of abstract principles which govern the conduct of all people 
(a general norm) by equal rules, in opposition to the state governed by people (the order 
of an individual or group of individuals). Such a state acts on the basis of law and within 
its limits. The above statement corresponds with the apprehension of the law-abiding 
state. The law observing state is formally characterized by functioning on the basis of, 
and within the limits of law whereas its substantial dimension means that the law is equal 
(equal for everyone). This description is not sufficient to characterize the rule of the law 
state. It is only a fragment of even broader concept of the democratic state ruled by law.
Keywords: democratic state ruled by law, rule of law, legitimacy, legalism, rule of law, 
law-abiding state principles, the principle of trust in the state and the law.
Pojęcie państwa prawnego
Streszczenie
Współcześnie ustroje wielu państw są opisywane jako ustroje państw prawnych, prawo-
rządnych czy demokratycznych państw prawnych. Zwykle zauważa się, że cechą państwa 
prawnego, inaczej niż w wypadku państwa rządzonego przez ludzi (np. rozkaz jednostki), 
jest to, że władzę sprawuje system abstrakcyjnych reguł, które kierują postępowaniem 
wszystkich ludzi (generalna norma) na jednakowych zasadach. Takie państwo działa 
na podstawie i w granicach prawa. Powyższe stwierdzenie odpowiada w zasadzie poj-
mowaniu państwa praworządnego. Państwo praworządne formalnie cechuje bowiem 
działanie na podstawie i w granicach prawa, zaś jego wymiar materialny oznacza, że prawo 
jest jednakowe (równe) dla wszystkich. Opis ten nie wystarczy dla scharakteryzowania 
państwa prawnego. Jest więc też tylko fragmentem opisu jeszcze szerszej koncepcji, jaką 
jest demokratyczne państwo prawne.
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Słowa kluczowe: demokratyczne państwo prawne, porządek prawny, praworządność, 
legalizm, zasady państwa prawnego, zasada zaufania jednostki do państwa i prawa.
Novum such as the authority of law (the rule of law) turned out not to be a real 
authority of a general norm, with omission of authority of people in the legislative 
as well as executive sphere. The specialty of such an approach is indicated in descrip-
tions of legislative and executive legal practice. Normativist, Hans Kelsen pointed 
out a lot of fictions as regards practice of making and applying law. According to his 
opinion, “actors” who play religious and social roles, after taking off masks, deprived 
of their attributes of power, appears solely as people who are oppressive to others 
and having their own interests. Therefore, the legal decisions are not only a matter 
of general formal “logic” or matter of a standard of minimal guaranties of human 
freedoms and rights. Realists indicate that the pure rational legal logic is insufficient 
for the legal settlements in a sphere of legal practice. According to Susan Haack1 
(who represents pragmatic movement and who followed path of Oliver W. Holmes 
but also Charles S. Peirce and William James), it is important to moderate between 
pure legal logic and extreme, cynic legal realism which find judgments to be results 
of discretionary authority of a judge.
Formation of the vision of the state ruled by law. 
Comprehension of law in a state of law
Formation of the concept of the state ruled by law
The vision of a rule of general (common) and equal law was not suddenly invented 
in a contemporary democratic state ruled by law but it is rooted in early stages of 
the state development. The basis for the foundation of the practice of a lawful state 
appeared in ancient times. For instance, Cicero deliberated over the Roman Repub-
lic. Later, certain significance for the formation of the vision of legal state appeared 
in thoughts of Middle Ages Christian philosophers. For instance, in the vision of 
Thomists, the man appears as a point of reference for the state and social harmony. 
1 S. Haack, The Pluralistic Universe of Law: Towards a Neo-Classical Legal Pragmatism, in: Law and 
Legal cultures in the 21st Century. Diversity and unity, eds. T. Gizbert-Studnicki, J. Stelmach, Wolters 
Kluwer, Warsaw 2007, p. 104.
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In this vision the state and the law are to support man’s innate instinct for seeking the 
good. The concept of nominalist, W. Ockham departs from the Thomists’ idea of the 
relation between human nature and the absolute. The base for the legitimacy of law is 
a condition of formal (procedural) correctness. Therefore, it is a different ground for 
lawfulness than the justifications based on fairness i.e. the harmony with the natural 
law. Conceptions, according to which the form and logical quest are important with 
reference to the state and the law, result in emancipation and collectivization of the 
state. When the human (statutory) law is not subjected to the natural law (“instinctus 
rationis of human nature”) the man’s settlements are possible to be made by unlimited 
voting, since the Christians’ concepts of limitation on demarcation and politics, were 
questioned2. In any case, the concept of the rule of law was influenced by the critic 
of the prior methods of governance and later by the enlightened and modernistic 
vision of the world. The new concept was inspired by the mechanical regularity and 
accuracy of the natural science or rationality of the logical and mathematical quest.
The concepts of: Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Sidney, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Mou-
nier, Condorcet, Constant, Guizot, Pufendorf, Thomasius, Wolf, Kant, and Hegel are 
especially important for the improvement of the vision of modern rule of law state. 
The formation of a current vision and practice of a rule of law state or law observing 
state happened in 18th century and it was related to the improvements of Enlighten-
ment as well as of industrial revolution (modernism). This concept included the 
objection against states of feudal origin, especially in its absolutist dimension (the 
arbitrary authority in the social relations and in relation to a man). The rule of law 
state was to be characterized not by free and unlimited authority exercised by the 
people but by the authority exercised by the state bodies which were to act based on 
law and with the use of means (forms) prescribed by the law. In opposition to state 
bodies which were allowed to act only according to law (legal permissions), people 
could do whatever was not forbidden (or prescribed) by the law. The compliance with 
law was meant to be secured by specially established institutions. The characteristic 
of a rule of law was the authority of law, not people.
The enlightenment quests affected the positivist vision of society and a new role of 
a man as a citizen who is responsible for the state’s law. This man was equipped with 
dignity, a free will and as an “adult” he was reluctant to the paternalistic and justified 
by metaphysics and absolute power, authority of other, “more perfect” people. The law 
which was a result of the order and will of monarch is replaced with the will of the 
sovereign nation which is expressed in the form of regulation (legal act). The classical 
judge from the time of Enlightenment becomes a “mouth of a legal act”. However, 
2 J. Staniszkis, Niespełnione marzenie [Unfulfilled dream], “Rzeczpospolita” 2005, February 26–27, p. A6.
60 Jerzy Oniszczuk
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
the science which shaped the new, non-metaphysical background for the authority 
of law, did not provide an answer for the question of how to form a law in the future 
so the technically corrected regulations (sound form) have a content which grasps 
human relation in justified and an efficient way (sound spirit). In other words, a new 
modern-positivist mechanism of creating, exercising and interpreting the law (transi-
tion of regulations into norms) did not offer the only goal of the enactment. In fact, 
it could not offer the only type of rationality and hierarchy of values. This turned out 
to be a matter of a political practice and in case of demarcation – a matter of public 
debate and legitimized political decision.
There is no sole, agreed “standard” of the lawful state. The deliberations are 
mostly related to the character of a model example of the rule of law i.e. whether it 
is formal or substantial. Many times the literature highlights the fact that this vision, 
in its strict sense, has formal (procedural) character. It is so because the conditions, 
which have to be fulfilled in order to determine whether the society is governed by 
the law (regulations) or by the individual, are very important. The contemporary 
vision of the rule of law state, except the lawfulness in the strict sense, captured also 
the substantial side of such a state.
The definition of the term, lawful state (rule of law) was in large degree formed 
by Robert von Mohl who referred to liberal vision of the state and social contract 
in the spirit introduced by John Locke. Long time ago, the literature (e.g. R. von 
Mohl) expressed a doubt whether it is possible to establish such a state based only 
on the common agreement of parties of a social contract. Some 19th century specula-
tions over the rule of law state, among others directed the attention to the possible 
mistakes, which may occur during the formation of such a state, e.g. such a state is 
established by the violent means, without approval of the people and “sufficient and 
higher authority”. It can also by an effect of unawareness of people as to the goals of 
the state and its means, without fulfillment of the conditions justified existence of the 
state, finally when the new organization of the state does not serve to the life goals of 
people. Mostly, Mohl highlighted the importance of goals and claims of individuals for 
the recognition of the rule of law (or lawful) state but also existence of the conscious 
will of the people and agreement among them. The duties of such a state are to: 1) 
secure a legal order “as a thing good by its nature” and as a base for every action 2) 
“support reasonable endeavors of people when their individual or organized acts are 
not sufficient3. In this vision the legal state “may not have a different purpose but: 
to regulate the life of a whole nation so that every member is supported and protected 
in free and comprehensive usage off all of his powers (…) Man’s freedom is in this 
3 R. von Mohl, Encyclopedia of political skills, Liber, Warsaw 2003, pp. 88–89, 99, 100, 279–284.
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vision a superior rule, (…) the state’s support may be only of negative character and 
must be based on removal of obstacles which are too difficult to be removed by an 
individual. (…) The only purpose of the whole state is to protect the freedom and 
make it possible”. The state is here a measure which serves to a human being, not the 
opposite4. In the 19th-century studies, the concept of separation of the law from mo-
rality appeared in the jurisprudence5.
The problem is still a relation between the form of the system and the rule of law 
(lawful) state. According to Mohl’s vision, “from the purpose of the lawful state one 
cannot implicate the form of the government” but he admitted that “legally, every 
form of state’s authority is acceptable if only its supports the goals of human life”. In 
this vision, the practicality was to determine the form of the state. Therefore, the legal 
state may have a form of the classical (direct) or indirect democracies (the authority 
of the people). The fundamental base of the rule of law state was expressed in fact 
that those who exercise power “cannot act utterly arbitrarily and change or limit the 
general rules of the rule of law state”. Criterion of such a state is subjection of all people 
to a statutory law. For this reason e.g. despotism is not a form of a rule of law state 
since it is based on a compulsion of an authority of an individual, who is interested 
solely in fulfillment of his own will where the rights of citizens are not obeyed. That 
is why, the power of people was not founded to be the only possible, justified or right 
form of rule of law state. This opinion was implied from the assumption that the 
rule of law state is to fulfill the “collective interests of people”. Therefore, the form of 
government, such as democracy, is only a measure to reach this goal. In that case, 
it is a reasonable opinion that the other forms of government are also justified but 
only as long as they are able to achieve the social goals. This justification would be 
better if the government was more useful6.
Comprehension of law in the concept of the state of law. 
Legal order
The understanding of law has a significant meaning for the traditional concept of 
the rule of law state. The law is viewed in positivist way as a hierarchical set (system) 
of general (universal) abstract norms, which is derived from legally approved state 
4 Opinion of R. Mohl, cited in the A. Bosiacki’s Preface to the Encyclopedia of political skills by 
R. von Mohl, …, p. XXX–XXXII, XLVIII, also p. 200.
5 R. von Mohl, op.cit., p. 169.
6 Ibidem, p. 284–286, 314.
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authorities. The normative act, for example, the statute of Parliament, establishes 
norms of general and abstract nature (legal norms).
These law norms are contained in a lawmaking act, first and foremost in inde-
pendent lawmaking acts – statutory act. This act (statute) “sets rules and models of 
conduct, the addressees of which are legally bound to observe regardless of the legal 
foundation of their enactment, regardless of their subject matter, scope or the range 
of persons affected by them or the sanctions ensuring their observance”7.
Under the rule of law, the law is a phenomenon that is, to a great extent, au-
tonomous of the state as an organization implementing defined political tasks and 
it should not serve to bring to life political or economic objectives in a manner that 
may depreciate the role of the law and its acceptance by society. The use of the law 
as an instrument for implementing economic objectives, encompassing cases of 
economic difficulties, necessitates the observance of constitutional principles in force 
for creating law. Inter alia no state of superior economic need may serve as a basis 
for adjudication in matters of the constitutionality of legislation8.
In the traditional view of concepts of rule of law in the state the law is understood 
as: (1) the sovereign will of the equal citizens (people, nation) expressed in (2) the 
set of general and abstractive norms which is (3) characterized by the fact that such 
norms constitute system, i.e. they are characterized by the vertical non-contradiction, 
horizontal coherence and completeness. (4) Mentioned will is expressed by the legal act 
which usually has a form of a written text, (5) which consist of regulations including: 
principles, ordinary norms, organizational rules, administrative directions. Based on 
the interpreted legal norms (6) the individual rule of conduct, relevant to the specific 
situation is determined. Traditionally, the formula of the authority of law is based 
on acceptance of 1) primacy of the parliamentary act 2) the law as an uniformed 
system of norms, 3) necessary coherence between executive general sources of law 
(e.g. ordinances of administrative bodies) and acts, 4) differentiation of meaning of: 
a) principles, b) so called ordinary rules c) organizational rules, d) other normative 
indications, administrative directions. In the rule of law state, may be binding only 
“will” of the one coherent within the system norm of conduct, which is adequate for 
the specific social situation. Finally, the law in the rule of law state should fulfill some 
formal conditions which guarantee its certainty such as: conduct pro futuro, relative 
permanence, synthetic character or the certainty of acquired rights.
7 W. Zakrzewski, Zakres przedmiotowy i formy działalności prawotwórczej [The Subject Matter and 
Forms of Lawmaking Activity], Warsaw 1979, p. 18.
8 J. Oniszczuk, A Selection of The Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s Jurisprudence from 1986–1999, 
Trybunał Konstytucyjny, Warsaw 1999, p. 59.
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Described law is typical for the rule of law state in the formal comprehension. 
Conventionality of the form and process of creation of law appears as a formal 
and legal problem even when the normative content is a substance of law which is 
a regulator of social relations. Such content may be continually and completely freely 
created, but it may also be created with consideration of certain substantial content 
– the standard of freedom and human rights. This component is a second, necessary 
wing of the rule of law state. Such a project of the rule of law state expresses a certain 
level of formal and substantial expectations. In case of substantial requirements 
there is located the system of values with which the legal acts must comply. Differ-
ently from the law observing state, which governs and is governed by the legal acts, 
in case of the rule of law state appears the necessity of compliance with certain level 
of formal and substantial requirements which come out from so called standard of 
the freedoms and rights of a human9.
The social order is very often defined as a set of various relations which enables 
the lasting social connections. Therefore, the order in which the man appears is 
mostly formed by the social rules. These rules, which are established or approved 
by the state, form the social order described as a legal order. This order refers to cer-
tain vision of the social order. It is a part of the social order. The law appears as an 
important element of the formation of the social order along with other factors like 
morality or various beliefs. The different legal systems have been created with the 
participation of the state (international law), or so called supranational law. Finally, 
the social law appears which is recognized by the state in collective labor contracts 
or so called lex Mercatora.
The social character of law is seen as a sign of its descent from the state, viewed 
as a social organization which carries out the values of social importance. The social 
character of law is influenced by the fact that it results from the process which takes 
place in the large social group, which is a state. It is admitted that the law is to ex-
press, not only certain values and interests, but also to produce certain conduct of 
people. Broadly speaking, it is often asserted that the norms indicating the models 
of conduct of a man are formed to secure certain values. Among such values there 
are ones which are derived from the basic biological needs e.g. life and health as the 
highest value of the man. Also, the man’s conduct and interests are a real premise of 
formation of law. The social structures of different character also influence creation 
9 For example the previous Decisions of the CT have already enhanced the belief that the democratic 
rule of law also covers certain substantive matters, in particular those related to individual rights and 
freedoms. That line of reasoning led to the inference from constitutional principle of democratic state 
ruled by law of such aspects for the legal status of an individual’s access to courts, the right to dignity and 
the right to life, right to private life. See: J. Oniszczuk, op.cit., p. 207.
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of law. The law has to secure the basic biological needs of a man as well as secure 
his safety and freedom to provide him with circumstances to cultural improvement. 
The law is not only to protect (preserve) the values important for the man but also 
is to influence formation of new standards of conduct, which aims to increase the 
confidence of people to the law and the state, which enacts it. In other words, except 
for goods which are important for a man from biological point of view, a man has 
also other needs important for his existence. They are related to the sphere of culture 
in which he lives. Surrounding environment influences a man but also man has an 
impact on different cultural occurrences. Within the norm of conduct appear some 
issues which are important from the legislator’s point of view, i.e. legislator’s needs, 
opinions and interests. The knowledge the legislator has about the man and the world 
is reflected in these things. The legal norm of conduct is then a rule distinguished from 
many different psychophysical acts of people and it gives the direction for a desired 
action. Aforesaid inclusion of the significant social values within the content of legal 
norms is interpreted as an institutionalization of these values (“transition to a social 
practice”)10. The state law, generally speaking, should express and protect the interests 
and values important from the state’s and man’s point of view (democratic state ruled 
by law). Besides this justification, the legal norm is determined by social securities 
in a form of the state’s guaranty to fulfill the norm. According to above presenta-
tion, the legal norm, which is an important verbal phrase, is formulated as a social 
fact meaning that the rule “is purposefully created by people who aim to achieve 
socially determined goals”11. Traditional depiction of legal rule in a social character 
introduces it as a type of a social norm which: 1) is derived from the strongest social 
organization, a state, which has monopoly on power, 2) compliance with it is necessary 
in order to avoid state’s compulsion, 3) its formation is not depended on the decision 
of entity which is obliged to exercise law or of other subjects, 4) it expresses only 
the will of the state, 5) it appears only in form determined by the state, 6) it fulfills 
the necessary minimum of the substantial requirements (e.g. justice, human rights).
The rule of law within the rule of law state (law governed state) does not refer 
to the law but to the legal order. The issue is the circumstances of the legal order 
in the society directed by the vision of the rule of law state. There is not the only 
agreed model of the rule of law state. Therefore, the deliberation over the condition 
of the rule of law state is mostly supported by some concepts. As may be recalled 
here, a significant example saying that the social order, based on the rule of the law 
state, should fulfill certain condition on the political, social and economic level. 
10 S. Ehrlich, Norm, group, organization, Warsaw 1998, p. 35.
11 J. Wroblewski, The rules of formation of law, Warsaw 1989, p. 7, 8.
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The first case is about “the civil right, based on the rule of the majority, to choose 
the legal system with the guaranty of the legal and factual possibility for existence 
of legal and organized opposition and peaceful change of governing group”. On the 
other hand, the social level assumes the existence of basic rights and freedoms of 
citizens including freedom of speech and assembly as a foundation of a social system. 
Finally, the economic condition means that the foundation of the economic system 
is the private property and a free market. In addition, it is expected that this order 
should provide for existence of civil society12. Law, in such a political system, results 
from the democratic social contract. It regulates certain level of man’s rights, rules 
for exercise of power, its scope, permissible intervention of a state in the rights of 
individuals (e.g. based on the rule of common good), exercise of the citizens’ control 
over the public authority, existence of system of expression of interests for different 
individual as well as collective subjects, procedures and forms of creation of law, 
selection of authorities.
Legality in the state of law. Governing by the rule of law. 
Principle of legalism
The meaning of legality
1) Legality in the rule of law state is associated with the situation of guaranteed 
legal order. The term legality is commonly understood as compliance, in any situa-
tion, with law by different subjects such as natural persons, legal persons, agencies 
of local government or state bodies. In this case it is difficult to notice whether the 
term “legality” brings any new quality in relation to law and its order i.e. if the law 
guarantees the order. It is different when the legitimacy refers to the conduct of public 
bodies (governing) and is to express only exercising of power through the law by the 
governing bodies. The issue here is what “to govern” means. The term “govern” has 
different meanings. Generally speaking, it is a situation of governing activity, which 
in case of law means ability to constitute, exercise and execute law. In case of legiti-
mate action of state’s bodies, it means that the acts of exercising and constituting law 
happen on a base of law and within its boundaries. The compliance with law is a basic 
duty of every state body and fulfillment of such a demand may determine legality. 
12 L. Morawski, The major problems of contemporary philosophy of law. The law in the stage of trans-
formation, LexisNexis, Warsaw 2005, p. 250 and next and recalled N. S. Marsh, The Rule of Law as a Su-
pra-National Concept, in Oxford Essays on Jurisprudence, ed. A. G. Guest, Oxford 1961; R. Dahrendorf, 
Endangered civil society, in: Europe and the civil society, p. 236.
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This requirement is described as a formal legality. The second form of legality also 
has been shown as substantial legitimacy. It results from the expectation that the law, 
especially when it comes to the basic social relations and human rights has to treat 
everyone equally. According to this vision of legality all citizens are equal before the 
law but also are subject to the same law. Such legality results in a duty to obey the 
law by the public authorities and in unacceptability of so called selective usage of law. 
Such an understanding of approach to the legality of the governing authorities was 
initiated by the enlightenment idea which was mostly supported by the concept of 
social contract, separation of powers and the right to property. This stance resulted 
in the idea of the limited ability of the government to invade in the sphere of rights 
and freedoms of individual and in belief that the government may act only within 
the borders designated by the law, which cannot be arbitrary.
One can add that the principle of substantive legality was interpreted as requir-
ing that “law represent values reflecting the democratic nature of the State”. One of 
the values (besides social justice, equality, humanism and democracy of law) related 
to the interests and will of the people, which law is to implement, is the requirement 
of social stability (constancy) of rights guaranteed by statutes and related to the legal 
safety of citizens13.
The legality is secured by so called formal and substantial guaranties.
Noncompliance with law by the state’s bodies means to burden an individual 
(organization of individuals) with a variety of consequences, on the other hand it 
means to shift the responsibility for such a situation on the abstract subject (state). 
Since no one should benefit from the fact that the law is violated (no legitimate action) 
public bodies (specific subject exercising power) cannot, even if show compliance with 
the rule of extraordinary caution in the area of constitutional rights and freedoms of 
individual, free themselves from the obligation of returning goods (benefits) in the 
whole extent or from covering citizen’s lost.
2) The term legal order does not tell directly how the rule of law should look 
like, this is indicated by the mentioned principle of legality. In case of the rule of 
people, the exercise of power by the means of law is only one of the forms of rule 
of people. In some legality states the rule may be based on directing on behalf of 
the state, one group of people by another. Although, the lawful state in which the 
“authorities” do not govern the society by means of law but the broadly understood 
law governs, is a state where the rule of law is present. In this case, we talk about 
the law, which not only has a formal and legal origin (“well born” in terms of form 
of an act and the procedure of enactment) and not only refers to the sovereign will 
13 J. Oniszczuk, op.cit., p. 33.
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of the sovereign nation, people and so forth, over which there is no power. All of 
this is enough to justify the governing by law and replacement of this term with the 
term of rule of law state creates confusions. It may be qualified in one group, ac-
cording to the form and the will of the sovereign, the law of the ancient tyrannies, 
democracies, the law in the form of Middle Age king’s orders, or even parliaments 
of the contemporary totalitarian regimes or acts of the lawful state. However it will 
not designate the accurate qualification from the standpoint of law of rule of law 
state. This law represents a different quality.
The principle of legalism
The principle of legalism derives from the concept of a rule of law state. In de-
mocracy it is expected that the authority is expressed in action of the state actors 
prescribed in legal regulations. The interpretations may be recalled saying that the 
rule of law state is characterized by the respect to the principle of legality, which is 
logically tided to the principle of legalism14. Other interpretations take directly the 
principle of legalism as a principle of legality (observance of law [the rule by law and 
based on law])15. Most often this principle is seen as a duty of all state’s bodies to act 
based on law and within the limits of law. The duty of compliance with law concerns 
the bodies constituting and exercising law (administration, courts) and other bodies16. 
In other words, every body has to have authorization (legitimacy) in the constitu-
tion or regulations to act and has to introduce the legal base for its action. While 
in relation to a citizen such a base is duly proclaimed regulation which has univer-
sally binding power. From discussed regulation it is implicated that in opposition 
to individual, who is allowed to do anything which is not forbidden17, the state body 
must have a clear (not presumed) legal authorization to act, which includes the base 
for its existence as well as scope of its activity. Therefore, everything which is not al-
lowed to the state’s body by the law is forbidden. When it comes to the institutional 
mechanisms of protection of legality, the responsibility of the state for the damages 
caused by state’s actors and ensuring the citizens access to the court. In any case, 
in the rule of law, the statutes are above the state and the “rule of law not of people” 
14 W. Sokolewicz, The Republic of Poland – democratic state ruled by law, PIP 1990, vol. 4, p. 12.
15 H. Izdebski: Fundaments of the contemporary states, Warsaw 2007, p. 107. According an article 7 
of the Constitution: The organs of public authority shall function on the basis, and within the limits, of 
the law.
16 Z. Witkowski, in: Z. Witkowski, J. Galster, B. Gronowska, A. Bien-Kacala, W. Szyszkowski, Con-
stitutional Law, Toruń 1998, p. 65, 66.
17 This rule was verbalized in the article 5, second sentence of the French Declaration of Rights of 
Men and of the Citizen from 1789 (“everything what is not forbidden is allowed”). 
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is treated as a method of governance, whereas the bodies of a public authority are 
bound by the law. The principle of legalism has been treated herein as a principle of 
the formal legality (the body has to prove the legal authorization /legitimacy/ while 
exercising public authority)18.
In the older jurisprudence, Constitutional Tribunal stated that, the principle of 
the rule of law, and the principle of legalism give rise to the rule barring state bodies 
from establishing normative acts inconsistent with higher-ranking normative acts 
and the rule obligating each body to act solely within the limits of its legally defined 
powers. Every violation of the law by a state body, including a violation that occurs 
in the legislative process, at the same time constitutes a failure to observe the law. 
According to other examples of decisions of the CT, norms of law introduce a division 
into benefits which may be granted (optional benefits) by administrative body and 
benefits which must be granted if circumstances specified by law are met (obligatory 
benefits). Such rules should be classified, as entailing a delegation for an administra-
tive body to act at its discretion. Making a final decision dependent on the discretion 
of such a body does not, however, mean complete freedom in granting the benefit. 
Administrative bodies established to provide aid are limited by the fairly precisely 
specified range of needs they can satisfy and by the funds at their disposal, but the 
final decision is both discretionary and constitutive. It is the administrative body that 
evaluates a specific event, and only after a positive decision is issued, one can talk of 
the person who is to be granted aid as a person eligible to receive a benefit. In accord-
ance with the requirements of the democratic rule of law and pursuant to principle 
that “all state organs (...) shall operate on the basis of the law”, no “free” acts (i.e. acts 
that are not subject to certain legal limits and to review) of the administration are 
envisaged. From a formal institution providing for the free and totally unrestrained 
ability to make decisions, free discretion is only transformed into a form of certain 
flexibility of the administration. Such a flexibility which enables and obligates suit-
able organs to examine all the circumstances of a given case in order to seek the 
most appropriate settlement reflecting the objective truth and the objective of such 
settlement. Thus, free discretion becomes a special form of implementing the provi-
sions of the law in that the organ following the law is to take into consideration the 
individual conditions of each case. Its establishment is possible only to the extent 
that enables the organ to issue a decision in conformity with the intention of the 
lawmaker. Such operation of the administrative body must, however, be justified and 
must be subject to review. The allocation of goods should also be subject to a court 
18 J. Sobczak, in: Polish Constitutional Law, eds. W. Skrzydło, E. Gdulewicz, M. Grant, G. Koksanowicz, 
W. Krecisz, R. Mojak, W. Orlowski, S. Patyra, P. Sadowski, J. Sobczak, W. Zakrzewski, Lublin 2005, p. 109.
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review. It is commonly believed that the social importance of court review over the 
administration with respect to the distribution of goods does not necessitate wider 
justification. Review is an important factor in ensuring legality in the essential area 
of operation of the state administration and an effective instrument in protecting 
the interests of the citizens19.
In examining the constitutionality and legality of a regulation, it must be established 
whether: a) the regulation was passed under an express (not only presumed) delega-
tion of a statute; b) in terms of the object and content of the regulated relations, the 
regulation falls within the limits of the delegation granted by the lawmaker to issue 
such an act; c) the regulation contravenes the piece of legislation on the basis of which 
it is issued and the content of other legislation. The constitutionality of a regulation 
is also conditional on the statement that it is issued not only in accordance with the 
provisions of the statute on which it is based, but also with all the remaining body of 
legislation directly or indirectly regulating the content of the regulation20.
Freedom of a man as a base of compliance with the law. The 
characteristic of protection of freedoms and rights of individuals as 
a fundamental element of law in the order of a rule of law state
From the standpoint of the anthropological requirement, the thought was ex-
pressed that, in order to achieve the subordination to law (compliance with law), 
the free and conscious man must appear. This feature of free and sensible subjection 
to law is not noticed in case of slaves (who were used as tools). Therefore, as was 
marked by Francesco Viola, the rule of law implicates mostly that the law is not the 
feature of the society of slaves. In case of freedom of citizens, the principle of rule of 
law expects that the law will be understood as a common enterprise of the legislator, 
these who exercise law and citizens. Within this cooperation every subject has its 
own function i.e. defining some general, allowing action norms, then interpreting 
and applying them, and finally taking these rules as indications of a conduct. In this 
view, the complementarity of law in relation to the rule of separation of powers is 
noticed21. It is important to emphasize a circumstance that the condition for the 
rule of law state, where the sensible compliance with law takes place, is freedom of 
19 See: Decision CT-s dated 29 September 1993 (K.17/92) in: J. Oniszczuk, op.cit., p. 113–114; S. Bier-
nat, Rozdział dóbr przez państwo. Uwarunkowania społeczne i konstrukcje prawne, [The Distribution of 
Goods by the State. Social Ramifications and Legal Constructions], Ossolineum, Wrocław 1989, p. 267.
20 J. Oniszczuk, op.cit., p. 127.
21 F. Viola, The rule of Law in Legal Pluralism, in: Law and Legal Cultures in the 21st Century, eds. 
T. Gizbert-Studnicki, J. Stelmach, Warsaw 2007, p. 105 and next and recalled P. Craig, Formal and Sub-
stantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework, Public Law 1997, pp. 267–87.
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a man, understood as a stance opposite to a position of a slave. It is understood that 
the invasion of law in the substance of civil spirit of an individual and its deprivation 
of basic content means simultaneously that the state departs from its legal version.
Assertion, that in the rule of law state, the law is over the people, not only takes 
up the problem that the formal indications, will of a sovereign or even the com-
mon will binding individual resulting from e.g. the social contract are insufficient 
for recognition of such “a thing” as a law. In this approach, such a thought saying 
that the will of the commonwealth binds individuals and moreover that such law 
will be obeyed22, does not seem to be sufficient for acknowledging that it is law of 
the rule of law state. Therefore, even if the law has certain substantial features of 
the law such as justice, understood as a social sense of fairness of general character 
(justice, integrity), it is still too little to determine the law of the order of rule of law 
state. In such a state important are freedoms and rights of individuals, so the law is 
directed toward protection of freedom and rights of individuals in the state. This law 
is not against society, nor the state but also not up to state’s will, nor against different 
individuals nor according to their will. Thus, the law formally correct, supported by 
the will of the sovereign, expressing the general belief of its justice, is still not a law 
for the individual or a law embodying individual’s will. It is still the law for the gov-
ernors. Such legitimacy is not given by the democratic elections and electors since 
this way may only determine the bodies of the state’s authority and next enacting of 
law on behalf of the state (even if it is accepted that this is the organization of certain 
society). Interests and rights of society in the democratic state may be expressed by 
its bodies in the election; however, in such a way the equally important interests and 
freedoms of individuals are not expressed. Even though because the large number of 
individuals does not make a society. And the individual, despite of his social character 
is fundamentally not a reduced society. The individual is characterized by certain 
(but limited) autonomy (“sovereignty”) in relation to society and its organizational 
forms including the state. The rule of law may take place even when the formula of 
the state’s bodies acting “based and within the limits of legal regulations” is remained, 
because still the will and desire of “power” may be present, without considering the 
sense of law, which notices also a goal of the law absorbing not only the conduct but 
also the improvement of man’s freedoms. There is no law when the man’s freedom 
is not retained23. That is why, not only the arbitrary acts of the public government 
are not allowed (forbidden), political decisions of parliament as well as the decisions 
on the usage of the law, but also the freedoms and rights of individuals should be 
22 J. J Rousseau, Remarks on Polish government, in: Social contract, Warsaw, 1966, p. 51.
23 Ibidem, p. 187.
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considered. For that reason, the constitution and institutions which secure it (e.g. the 
system of constitutional courts) do not solve especially the problem of arbitrariness: 
1) substantial of the legislator, in case when the constitutional control has a formal 
character, 2) formal of the legislator, when the constitutional control has the sub-
stantial character, 3) formal and substantial constitutional control when the control 
is formal and content related. In any case, the constitutional court, testing itself by 
verification of its rulings, which formally control the constitutionality, in case of 
substantial integrity may only try to justify its reaction, stating that it will determine 
substantial discrepancies of the regulation against the constitution, only when such 
a discrepancy is especially grave or glaring. In any case, it does not exclude possibility 
of “the oppression on behalf of the law”24.
The foregoing indicate that the contemporary understanding of law (rule of law 
state) is not equal to the law of such a state in the traditional version of Rechtsstaat 
“which includes political rights of citizens, guaranty of the private property, courts’ 
independence, action of the public administration based on legal regulations which 
implicate the judicial control over administration and equality before the law”25. 
With this new conception of a law of the rule of law state are associated not only 
mentioned political and civil rights but also economic and socio-cultural rights. 
In connection with aforesaid, the question arises: whether the universalization of 
political and socio-economical rights of individuals, has in fact concluded its “long 
historical process in which people become equal participants of their societies” what 
was predicted by T. H Marshall26.
Catalog of principles of rule of law state. General remarks
Introduction
The rule of law state, generally speaking, is described as a state which action is 
based on law but also as a state which guarantees that the law is obeyed by all subjects 
active within the territory of state’s jurisdiction. The rule of law state is characterized 
by the number of principles. They concern enactment of law, its exercise as well as 
content of public law and content of guaranteed private law i.e. rights and obligations 
of parties in the field of the private law.
24 G. Sartori, Theory of the democracy, Warsaw 1994, pp. 400–402.
25 K. Frieske, Sociology of law, Polskie Wydawnictwo Prawnicze Iuris, Warsaw 2006, p. 262.
26 Ibidem, p. 268.
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Robert von Mohl, who was inspired by projects of John Locke and Georg W. Hegel, 
tried to name the set of principles of the rule of law state (viewed as a measure which 
serves to a man, not opposite). This philosopher noticed features of rule of law state 
emphasizing these which concern: 1) authority’s attributes and 2) rights of individuals 
and their organizations. When it comes to characteristic of the authority (annotation 
1) he found that the public authority: a) has jurisdiction over all citizens and their 
organizations so they may be “obedient to the rules of the organization” (constitu-
tion); since the goal of the state is an equal support of its citizens, the citizens should 
also have equal duties toward the state; b) may use any means that serve to the state’s 
goal, which comply with the law c) decides if the individual expectations of support 
are related to the important and general interests so it is justified to use common 
goods (the state should settle the conflict by giving the priority to the common, 
not individual good). Among so called human rights (annotation 2) which have 
to cumulatively appear with this first type of rights, there are rights: a) political, 
b) civil and private. First of all, the thinker distinguished equality before the law, 
with no regard to personal characteristics, social status and freedom in achieving 
own goals as long as it does not violate rights of other people and the durability of 
the institution of the state. In the sphere of the civil law sensu stricto he located: 
1) right to the durable residency within the state in the freely chosen place (there 
is related duty of not expelling citizens from the state except certain circumstances 
and the right of a man to emigration), 2) right to participation in benefits produced 
by the state with preservation of the conditions of the common good for the largest 
group of citizens and then smaller groups of citizens and moreover, on the one hand 
not to sacrifice current goals for the future generations, on the other not to deprive the 
further generations from means allowing them to exist, 3) the right for the personal 
development and assembly (which included: a) freedom of occupation, b) physical 
and intellectual development, c) freedom of free expression and to know opinions 
of others, d) freedom of religion, e) free formation of associations which pursue 
legal private interests, 4) personal freedom (which means permissibility of arrest, 
frisk, control of correspondence, only in accordance with regulations), 5) safety of 
the property against its arbitral and unjust limitation by the state, 6) right to file 
“a complaint about not fulfilling justified demands or about tolerance for factual 
unfairness”. When it comes to the political rights, they were related to exercising of 
governmental power (legislative) and control over government. Among these rights 
was ability to: a) hold (exercise) an office, b) active and passive participation in for-
mation of representations27. It should be added here that the rule of equality before 
27 R. von Mohl, op.cit., pp. 199–209, 279–284.
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the law (and equality of electoral rights, which are significant here) were not limited 
by any condition e.g. property census.
The significant topicality of these rules is noticed, even because of their presence 
in constitution of democracies on the beginning of the XXI century. Other condi-
tions of the lawful state are: conduct based on law in accordance with constitution 
and guarantying dignity and human rights, justice and legal certainty28.
The principle of confidence of an individual in law  
and in the law-enacting state. Detailed rules of the general 
principle of confidence
The rule of law embodies maintaining the confidence of citizens in the state. The 
special significance of the principle of confidence in the state and law enacted by the 
state is indicated by the constitutions of democratic states. In different proposals for 
“standard” rule of law state many principles are named, which have to be obeyed 
by the legislator, while the general principle of the confidence is commonly seen as 
the one which has to be fulfilled in order to determine whether the state is lawful. 
The traditional vision of the democratic rule of law state finds relation between the 
principle of confidence of a citizen in the state and the principle of the loyalty of 
the citizen to the state. The confidence of an individual in democracy is improved 
by the fulfillment of certain level of formal and material conditions. It is impossible 
to develop confidence to a disloyal democracy i.e. when the state e.g. produces law 
which is arbitrary, wrong, empty, does not secure people’s improvement or safety or 
even endangers the certainty of existence of an individual. Real conduct and imag-
ined possibilities of loyal democracy are the necessary conditions of obtaining the 
confidence of citizens by this democracy.
First of all, it must be noted that the principle of legal confidence is based on 
assumption of some certainty of law and on the predictable conduct of state’s bod-
ies. Especially, the issue is the protection of equitably granted (obtained) rights, 
effectiveness of law after enactment in future (pro futuro) and after it is accessible, 
which means non activity from the retroactive date (antedate of law) or finally proper 
(proportional) intervention in the socio-economic life of an individual. In case of such 
a condition in form of certainty of law, it was stressed that the law and the procedures 
of its stabilization are to be characterized by certainty and reasonable stability (rela-
tive invariability). It also means the predictability of the settlements regarding the 
legal position of an individual. This principle is based on the certainty of law, which 
28 A. Bosiacki, Introduction, in: R. von Mohl, op.cit., p. XXXIV.
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is understood as a set of features, which provide for legal safety of an individual 
– enable him to make decisions regarding his own conduct based on possibly full 
knowledge of premises of actions of state bodies as well as legal consequences of 
such actions. The individual should have ability to predict consequences of certain 
actions and occurrences on the ground of law binding in this certain time, as well as 
should have expectation that the legislator will not change law in arbitrary and sud-
den manner. With the certainty of law the rule of legal safety is associated, whereas 
the certainty of law means, not only the absolute stability (permanence) of legal 
regulations, but also conditions for the predictability of the conduct of state actors 
and related to them actions of citizens. Such understanding of predictability of the 
state’s conducts guarantees confidence in legislator and in law enacted by lawmaker. 
Often the unavoidable increase of burden, which happens as a result of change of the 
law, should be done in a way giving individuals who are to be bound by such a law, 
time to rationally dispose of their interests. The legal safety of an individual related 
to legal certainty enables predictability of conduct of state’s bodies and prediction of 
his own acts. In this way the following are fulfilled: a) the freedom of an individual 
who makes his decisions according to his preferences and takes responsibility for their 
effects b) his dignity through respect of the legal order for the individual viewed as an 
autonomous, rational existence. When the law is changed, these values are violated 
by the legislator if his decisions were not expected by an individual since he could 
not predict them under given circumstances, especially when the legislator may 
presume, while making his decisions, that if the individual had predicted that change 
of the law he would have made different decisions about his matters (interests). The 
certainty of law is understood here as a certainty of the fact that the citizen forms 
his life relations based on binding law. In this second meaning certain law (legal 
certainty) means also a just law. It may be said here that the citizen has also a right 
to be respected by the legislator. The respect for an individual who is autonomous and 
rational is demanded by his dignity and freedom. The following terms are important 
for understanding of discussed principle of confidence: “predictability” (the action 
of the public bodies) and “forecasting” (the circumstances proper for maintaining 
individual’s own interests, so his dignity is preserved).
According to various legal concepts it is to human rationality should lead to the 
mentioned vision of confidence conditioned by notions like freedom, equality and 
dignity. For instance the approaches respecting the rational nature of a man consider 
that such a character of a man causes that he tries to know himself and his closer 
and farther surroundings. However, the condition of making a choice of practical 
character is his freedom and equality as an individual. The level of freedom and 
equality of formal, as well as substantial, character rises or reduces the scope of man’s 
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responsibility for his own acts. As an effect, by aiming to settle his biological and civi-
lization problems he inclines, or even in higher or lower level, he actively participates 
in formation of a social order. The law should not cause him any problems in this 
field as long as his goal is to build a common good or a fine self-realization. Here, 
the important measurement of such good is a protection of human dignity, which is 
understood as a due, equal respect which results from the essence of human nature29. 
The law should serve to the reason included in the Immanuel Kant’s thought saying 
that the man should not be treated as a measure but as a goal. In this situation, for 
example, the instrumental character of the statutory law should serve to achievement 
of a goal which is a guarantee of a human dignity. Therefore, the regulation which 
does not meet the standard of utility of protection of human dignity may be found 
as a doubtful from the legal standpoint (the principle of confidence).
According the CT interpretation maintaining confidence in the state is – similar 
to substantive legality – a principle concerning constitutional law and, as such, it 
imposes certain obligations in the sphere of state activities. In the sphere of the state’s 
lawmaking activity, it imposes an obligation to draft laws in such a way so that civil 
liberties are not restricted if it is not required by an important social or individual 
interest protected by the Constitution. Next, it places an obligation on the lawmaker 
to grant rights to citizens and guarantee their enforcement, to enact laws in a consist-
ent and clear manner, intelligible to citizens and finally not to give retroactive effect 
to legal provisions. The maintenance of confidence in the state and social strength 
are based on nothing else but the stability. Thus, maintaining confidence in the state 
also becomes a basic value, referred to and protected by constitutional provisions, 
for the whole society30.
The especially significant detailed principles covered by the rule of law (and 
part of this principle i.e. principle of confidence) are among others: 1) the principle 
of certainty of law, 2) the principle of the transparency and of making law available 
to its addressees (accessibility of law), 3) the principle of clear formulation of the 
legal regulations, 4) the prohibition of retroactive application of law, 5) the duty of 
keeping an appropriate vacatio legis (a suitable adjustment of law), 6) the duty of 
duly formulation of so called temporary regulations, 7) the rule of loyalty of the 
state, 8) the principle of protection of rights equitably acquired, 9) the principle of 
sufficient specification, 10) the principle of proportionality of the conduct, 11) the 
rule of the conditional acceptance of the constitutional limitations of freedom and 
rights, 12) the principle of similar regulation of similar matters, 13) the principle of 
29 A. Kość, The fundamentals of the philosophy of law, Lublin 2001, p. 193.
30 J. Oniszczuk, op.cit., p. 33.
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the comparative durability of the imposed tribute, 14) the principle of not changing 
the amount of the tribute (fiscal) obligations within the fiscal year, 15) the princi-
ple of protection of so called pending interests, 16) the duty not to charge multiple 
times for the same offence, 17) the duty to realization of man’s dignity and freedom, 
18) The principle of the statutory legislation (and the system of law; the constitutional 
structure /sources/ of law.
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